Part of the price increase reflects higher costs: supply-chain disruptions, higher energy prices after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, avian flu, drought. Decomposition studies find that a large share of the increase went to corporate profits rather than to labor costs.
The Economic Policy Institute decomposed the growth in unit prices in the non-financial corporate sector. Historically (1979–2019), corporate profits accounted for about 11% of that growth, with unit labor costs about 62%. From the second quarter of 2020 through the end of 2021, the shares reversed: profits contributed about 54% and labor costs under 8%. The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City reached a similar conclusion for 2021, and the Groundwork Collaborative found corporate profits drove over 50% of inflation in mid-2023.
National accounts data point the same way. After-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP rose from about 9.6% in 2019 to a post-war record near 12.2% in 2021, and after-tax unit profits of non-financial corporations rose from about 11% to nearly 15% of the price of their output (BEA via FRED). Firms did not only pass rising costs through to consumers; many widened their margins at the same time — what economists have called "sellers' inflation".
This does not mean profits caused the inflation — the initial cost increases were real, and the profit share of GDP declined from its 2021 peak to about 11.4% in 2025. In the first half of 2026 it rose again, to about 12.8% (12.4% in the first quarter and 13.1% in the second), above the 2021 full-year value; the non-financial margin was about 14.3%. These are two quarters of BEA estimates and are subject to revision. The data do show where a large share of the additional amount households paid went: not to workers' wages, and not entirely to higher input costs, but to profits.